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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Barry Hecht appeals his sentence, contending that the 
District Court erred in enhancing his sentence on the 
ground that his crime was committed while on release from 
another federal offense. Hecht argues that the enhancement 
was improper because he was not notified of the possibility 
of enhancement at the time of his release on thefirst 
offense. We hold that pre-release notice of the possibility of 
enhancement is not required, and we accordingly affirm. 
 
I. 
 
From 1988 to 1989, Hecht ran a fraudulent gourmet 
cookie distributorship scheme, using false references and 
making misrepresentations to buyers to induce them to 
invest in the distributorships. In July 1994, he pled guilty 
to federal charges of conspiracy and wire fraud arising out 
of the scam. After entering his plea, Hecht was released on 
bail pending sentencing. He was sentenced to 18 months of 
imprisonment on October 25, 1994, and began serving his 
sentence on November 28, 1994. 
 
Unbeknownst to the authorities, from 1993 to 1995 
Hecht was also running a fraudulent sports merchandise 
distributorship operation called Pacesetters of North 
America, Inc. ("Pacesetters"). He made misrepresentations 
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to potential purchasers about Pacesetters' history and 
about the value of the merchandise they would receive. 
Pacesetters took in approximately $388,500 over the course 
of its operations and caused a loss of $321,000 to its 
victims. 
 
In 1998, Hecht pled guilty to one count of criminal 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371, in connection with the 
Pacesetters scheme. At sentencing, the District Court 
applied a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.S 2J1.71 
because Hecht had committed the offense while on pretrial 
release for a prior federal offense--viz., the cookie scam. 
The resulting sentencing range was 37 to 46 months; the 
District Court sentenced Hecht to the bottom of the range. 
Hecht appeals the enhancement. 
 
II. 
 
Hecht grounds his challenge on the Commentary to 
S 2J1.7, which states that "[a]n enhancement . . . may be 
imposed only after sufficient notice to the defendant by the 
government or the court." U.S.S.G. S 2J1.7, comment. 
(backg'd). Hecht claims that the enhancement may not be 
applied because he was not given notice, at the beginning 
of his pretrial release in the prior case, that the commission 
of a new federal offense during release would subject him to 
an enhanced sentence in the second case. We reject this 
argument. 
 
Guideline S 2J1.7 implements 18 U.S.C. S 3147, which 
provides in relevant part that "[a] person convicted of an 
offense while released under this chapter shall be 
sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the 
offense to . . . a term of imprisonment of not more than ten 
years." The Guideline provides for a three-level 
enhancement for cases within the ambit of S 3147. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Guideline provides that "[i]f an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3147 applies, add 3 levels to the offense level for the offense 
committed 
while on release as if this section were a specific offense characteristic 
contained in the offense guideline for the offense committed while on 
release." U.S.S.G. S 2J1.7. 
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Neither the statute nor the Guideline itself contains any 
notice requirement. Indeed, in United States v. DiPasquale, 
864 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1988), this Court squarely held 
that it could not "read the language or the legislative 
history of S 3147 as mandating explicit notice to a 
defendant of the possibility for sentence enhancement as a 
precondition to sentence." Rather, S 3147"is a self- 
executing and mandatory provision of law" that applies 
even in the absence of pre-release notice. Id . at 281 
(quoting United States v. Feldhacker, 849 F.2d 293, 299 
(8th Cir. 1988)). Accord United States v. Lewis , 991 F.3d 
322, 323-24 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 
The reference to "notice" in the Commentary cannot be 
read to overrule the unambiguous text of the statute and 
the Guideline, or to modify their mandatory nature. As the 
DiPasquale Court noted, Congress, in enacting the 
mandatory language of S 3147, could not have meant "that 
persons who commit the very crimes that the act intended 
to deter, should avoid punishment for those crimes because 
of the judicial officer's failure explicitly to remind the 
defendant of the consequences of his or her acts" before 
release. DiPasquale, 864 F.2d at 281. 
 
We read the Commentary to mandate, not pre-release 
notice in the first case, but simply pre-sentencing notice in 
the second case. This reading accords with DiPasquale and 
is bolstered by the history of the Commentary. Before its 
amendment in 1989, the Commentary to S 2J1.7 provided 
that "[a]n enhancement under 18 U.S.C. S 3147 may be 
imposed only upon application of the government; it cannot 
be imposed on the court's own motion." See United States 
v. Vasquez, 113 F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 1997). The note to 
the 1989 amendment stated that the amendment merely 
"corrects the description in the Background Commentary of 
the operation of the statute to which this guideline applies." 
U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 431. This note suggests that the 
amendment's language simply clarified that a defendant 
should be provided pre-sentencing notice of the possibility 
of an enhancement; pre-release notice is nowhere 
mentioned. See Vasquez, 113 F.3d at 388. 
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III. 
 
Hecht does not deny that he received pre-sentence notice 
of the potential enhancement both in his Presentence 
Report and during plea negotiations. Accordingly, we affirm. 
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